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INTRODUCTION 
I am greatly honored to be invited to speak to such a distinguished 
audience of scholars at this highly regarded law school.  Because I am 
not an academic, and, in the scholarly realm, more of a dilettante, my 
comments may more appropriately be regarded as light luncheon 
entertainment.  All I bring to the table is the perspective of a judge.  For 
eighteen years, before I went on the Delaware Supreme Court, I was a 
Court of Chancery trial judge, where many of the cases I decided were 
corporate law, and more specifically, fiduciary duty disputes.  I still do 
that, but not as much, since the Court of Chancery is only one of three 
courts from which my current court hears appeals.  The upside, though, 
is that being an appellate judge gives one the luxury of more time to 
think deeply.  Appellate courts, unlike trial courts, do not have to 
operate in “real time.” 
From that perspective, I would like to share with you some 
thoughts about a subject that I hope will interest you as legal scholars.  
                                                                                                  
† This lecture was held at Fordham University School of Law on May 8, 2012.  It was 
edited to remove minor cadences of speech that appear awkward in writing and to 
provide light references to explanatory materials.   
* Justice, Supreme Court of Delaware.  The lecturer’s remarks reflect his personal 
views and not those of his court or his colleagues on the bench. 
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The subject is the ongoing vitality of the implicitly empirical corporate 
law model (or profile) of the shareholder base of publicly held U.S. 
companies.  What do I mean by that?  For a long time, courts have 
implicitly assumed a portrait of shareholders that has driven our 
corporate law jurisprudence.  Our decisions often speak of “the 
shareholders,” and the duties that officers and directors owe to “the 
shareholders.”1  But those cases rarely, if ever, explicitly identify 
precisely whom we are talking about.  Shareholders, as we all know, 
come in many sizes, shapes, and flavors. 
Since the early 1930s when the federal securities laws were 
enacted, the implicit portrait or model underlying our corporate law 
decisions has been that of a diffuse, disaggregated group of retail (“mom 
and pop”) shareholders who, although educated and intelligent, are 
financially unsophisticated and lack the power and motivation to 
influence corporate governance or policy.  Implicit in that picture was 
the notion that those shareholders were long-term oriented, meaning 
they were content to receive a return on their risk capital over the longer 
term.  It is that implicit, unstated portrait—that public company 
shareholders as a group are unable to act collectively to protect 
themselves2—which underlies the cardinal corporate law principle that 
courts must be the agency to protect shareholders against overreaching 
fiduciaries. 
My thesis today is that, however accurate that model may have 
been in the past, it is now inconsistent with the reality on the ground and 
has been for some time.  Our capital markets are now “deretailized.”  
Today, the shareholder base of U.S. public companies consists of 
highly-sophisticated institutions that have the resources and power—
both economic and legal—to act collectively and influence governance.  
These institutions are also highly short-term oriented.   The question 
becomes: what implications does this new reality have for the 
formulation and application of judge-made fiduciary duty principles?   
My hope is to persuade you, as corporate law scholars, that this subject 
merits your attention. 
                                                                                                  
 1. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993), 
modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994), aff’d sub nom, Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995). 
 2. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 409–11 (1983). 
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My talk comes in two parts.  The first will flesh out this new 
shareholder reality and how it came about.  The second will ponder what 
effect, if any, it may have for corporate law theory and judicial decision-
making. 
THE NEW REALITY 
Our current shareholder model evolved from a reality that arose in 
the wake of World War II.  After 1945, the U.S. economy experienced 
its historically highest level of growth.  That led to the emergence of the 
American middle class, which, in turn, generated unprecedented and 
widespread investments in our capital markets by retail, “mom and 
pop,” investors who typically purchased shares in relatively small 
blocks.  As noted, those shareholders were widely dispersed, were 
unable to act collectively to influence management or governance 
policy,3 and had a long-term investment horizon.  That is, they were 
content to leave managements to grow the firm over the longer term, 
and with it, the value of their investments, with the goal of funding their 
retirement and their children’s college education. 
Beginning in the late 1960s, that reality began to change.  A 
confluence of events and forces gradually transformed the public 
company shareholder base I have just described into what it is today, 
notably a concentrated group of activist, institutional investors with a 
short investment horizon.  These institutions are empowered—and 
willing to use that power—to influence their portfolio companies’ 
managements to govern in a manner consistent with their short-term 
horizons.  There is no single cause of that transformation. Several 
developments combined to cause it. 
One of those developments was the “deretailization” of the 
American securities market.4  That came about because retail investors 
also had full-time jobs and little time or expertise to manage their own 
investment portfolios.  In response to that need, a new industry arose: 
professional, institutional investment managers, who performed that 
                                                                                                  
 3. Id. 
 4. ”Deretailization” was coined by Brian Cartwright, former General Counsel of 
the SEC, in an address to the University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law 
and Economics.  See Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, SEC, Address at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law and Economics: The Future 
of Securities Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm). 
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service for, and ultimately supplanted, the retail investors as the direct 
shareholders of our publicly held corporations. 
To illustrate, in 1951, individual retail investors owned over 75% of 
all outstanding corporate equities in the United States; by 1979, 
institutional investors as a group owned over 36%.5  Today, institutional 
investors, including public and private pension and retirement funds, 
mutual funds and hedge funds, control nearly 70%.  Those institutions 
are managed by persons or firms whose compensation depends on 
generating short-term returns from the portfolio company stocks that 
these institutions manage.  Those compensation arrangements create 
incentives for institutional investors to exert pressure on portfolio 
corporate managements and boards to deploy corporate assets and to 
develop business strategies to yield short-term profits, often at the 
expense of profits over the longer term. 
Those incentives have been enhanced and amplified at the portfolio 
company level by executive compensation arrangements, and also by 
pressures from the stock analyst community.  As we know, corporate 
executives are typically compensated with a package of cash and stock, 
weighted (primarily for tax reasons) in favor of stock and stock options.  
That creates incentives for corporate executives to manage their 
companies in a way designed to increase (or at least not lower) their 
companies’ stock price.  Amplifying these incentives is the stock analyst 
industry, which scrutinizes reported corporate quarterly earnings 
statements to see if the quarterly results meet management projections.  
If they do not, management gets an adverse report (the equivalent of a 
bad grade) that is often followed by a sell recommendation that sends 
the stock price downward. 
But other factors also drive the short-term perspective of these 
powerful institutions, wearing their hats as portfolio company 
shareholders.  Another factor is that those institutions hold their 
portfolio shares only for a short period of time.  Today, the rate of 
turnover of invested portfolio stock is extremely high.  At actively 
managed mutual funds, which constitute the primary investor in U.S. 
401(k) retirement funds, the annual turnover is about 100%.  From a 
broader perspective, the average turnover of all stocks traded on the 
New York Stock Exchange reached 138% per year in 2008, and 
                                                                                                  
 5. John Armour et al., The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed 
and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 219, 240 
(2011). 
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currently sits around 73% per year.6  The annual investment turnover by 
hedge funds is about 300%.7  My point is that today’s shareholder base 
consists primarily of institutional investors that have no long-term 
commitment to the corporations in which they invest.  Clearly, the 
model of the passive, patient retail investor has given way to a new 
reality. 
To round out this picture, one other important fact must be 
considered: these institutional shareholders have become both 
economically and legally empowered.  They are economically 
empowered because voting control is concentrated in a relatively small 
group.  As a former SEC General Counsel once observed, the 
representatives of the institutions holding a majority of the shares of 
U.S. public corporations could fit into a room smaller than this one.8 
And, they have become legally empowered because of structural 
changes in the legal environment that occurred during the last fifteen 
years or so.  Those legal changes have given public company 
shareholders the tools to influence corporate boards and managements to 
be more responsive to their agendas. 
These developments have been both judicial and statutory, and they 
have occurred at both the state and the federal levels.  Ironically, these 
developments, if viewed in isolation, are reforms that have laudable 
merit and were warmly welcomed by both the shareholder and academic 
communities.  My purpose here, however, is not to debate the merits of 
these developments, but merely to describe them and put them into 
perspective.  To sharpen this point, I focus on only two recent 
developments: first, the increased use of the shareholder by-law process 
to limit the power of boards to adopt governance rules, including 
takeover defenses; and second, the new rules providing for shareholder 
proxy access and proxy expense reimbursement. 
For several years, the activist shareholder community has sought to 
influence the governance of publicly held corporations through the by-
law amendment process.  The legal predicate for that effort is the fact 
that the Delaware General Corporation Law authorizes shareholders to 
                                                                                                  
 6. NYSE Share Turnover Since 1900, AVONDALE ASSET MANAGEMENT (Oct. 10, 
2012), http://www.avondaleam.com/2012/06/nyse-share-turnover-since-1900.html. 
 7. Alliance Bernstein, Hedge Funds: Finding the Right Allocation, THE 
BERNSTEIN JOURNAL: PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTING AND WEALTH MANAGEMENT, Fall 
2005, at 12, 14, available at https://www.alliancebernstein.com/Research-
Publications/CMA-created-content/PrivateClient/PDFs/Bernstein_Journal_Fall05.pdf.  
 8. See Cartwright, supra note 4. 
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adopt and amend by-laws, and provides that the board cannot eliminate 
or limit that power.9  For over a decade, institutional shareholders have 
invoked that authority to limit the board’s power to adopt poison pills.10  
Typically proposed and passed is a by-law providing that any board-
adopted pill will have a fixed duration, and that a shareholder vote will 
be required to adopt any new pill or revive one that has expired.11  That 
effort has, by and large, been successful: a large percentage of public 
companies have dismantled their poison pills. 
Institutional shareholders have also used the by-law amendment 
process to reform the proxy election system to require the corporation to 
reimburse the expenses of any shareholder group that nominates a “short 
slate” of board candidates who are then successfully elected.  That has 
significantly leveled the playing field by reducing the expenses of 
dissident groups seeking to wage a proxy contest.  In 2008, the 
Delaware Supreme Court held that proxy reimbursement was a proper 
subject for shareholder action and would not impermissibly infringe the 
board’s statutory power to manage the affairs of the corporation so long 
as the by-law does not restrict the board from discharging its fiduciary 
duties.12  As a consequence of that decision, the shareholder by-law 
process was legitimated as a matter of Delaware law, as a tool to enable 
activist shareholders to alter the composition of the board and thereby 
exert leverage to influence board decisions. 
These proxy reform tools have recently been codified into 
legislation at both the state and federal levels.  In 2009, the Delaware 
General Assembly adopted Sections 112 and 113 of the General 
Corporation Law.13  Like the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in CA 
Inc. v. AFSCME, these statutes operate to reduce the cost of waging a 
proxy contest by a dissident shareholder group.  Section 112 enables a 
                                                                                                  
 9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2012). 
 10. See Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and 
Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 205 (2005). See also id. at 209 (“The poison 
pill is “the most potent of antitakeover defenses.  If a corporation has a poison pill and a 
hostile bidder acquires enough of the corporation’s shares to trigger the pill, other 
shareholders will have the right to buy more shares at below-market prices, meaning 
that the bidder must buy those shares as well.  Alternatively, the pill could trigger the 
right to purchase more shares of the bidder at low prices 
after a merger has occurred, diluting the value of the bidder’s current shareholdings.”). 
 11. Id. at 210. 
 12. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008). 
 13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112, 113. 
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corporation to adopt by-laws that prescribe the conditions and 
procedures for including dissident shareholder groups’ proxy materials 
in the management proxy materials—which support the board’s director 
nominee slate—at company expense.14  For dissident shareholders that 
wish to conduct their own proxy solicitation (think Pershing Square or 
Icahn), Section 113 permits the adoption of by-laws that authorize the 
corporation to reimburse the dissident group’s proxy solicitation 
expenses under conditions prescribed in the by-law.15  Importantly, these 
statutes provide that, where shareholders adopt such by-laws, the 
directors cannot repeal them. 
What the Delaware Legislature made optional, the U.S. Congress 
made mandatory one year later in the Dodd-Frank Act.16  Section 971 of 
Dodd-Frank authorizes the SEC to adopt proxy access rules.  Although 
to date the SEC’s rulemaking process has had a rocky start,17 at some 
point we may have to contend with a preemptive federal “one size fits 
all” regulation that mandates public companies to include shareholder 
proposals in their company proxy materials. 
To conclude this first part, our current public company shareholder 
profile has eclipsed the model that came into existence after World War 
II.  A new reality has evolved that differs profoundly from what existed 
before.  Yet—and the critical fact is—that outdated portrait is still the 
model that continues to underlie our corporate fiduciary law 
jurisprudence.  That brings me to my second and final topic, which is: 
what are the implications of that new reality for crafting judge-made 
fiduciary law decisions?  More specifically, should our shareholder 
profile model be modified to conform to the new reality, and if so, then 
how and to what extent?  For me, this is a brand new conceptual area.  I 
therefore freely confess that what I offer today are more questions than 
answers.  But even so, I hope to persuade you, as scholars, that this 
question is worthy of your attention. 
                                                                                                  
 14. Id. § 112. 
 15. Id. § 113. 
 16. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 17. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding thatthe 
SEC “acted arbitrarily and capriciously for having failed once again . . . adequately to 
assess the economic effects of a new rule.”). 
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A NEW MODEL 
If I were you, I would probably be asking myself: is this really a 
problem?  That is a good question, and I would respond to it in this way: 
legal theory, like scientific theory, inescapably rests upon, and is tested 
by, an empirical foundation—that is, by some view of how the world 
actually works.18  In science, it is axiomatic that if the empirical data 
does not support a theory, then the theory must be modified to conform 
to the data.  By analogy, a corporate fiduciary legal theory is grounded 
upon an empirical model or assumption about how human beings 
actually behave and react to events.  Building on that analogy, I would 
suggest that if the model no longer corresponds to the reality, then the 
theory may no longer be sound and should be reexamined.  That is my 
position.  If you disagree, then you will probably find the rest of this talk 
of minimal value. 
But (and as I hope), if you do agree, we would reach the second 
question: even if the current shareholder model no longer conforms to 
the current reality, how do we go about determining whether, and if so 
how, the shareholder model needs to be changed?  As a cautious, risk-
averse judge, my answer would be: one small step at a time. 
What do I mean?  That is, how might one go about performing a 
fiduciary analysis that takes this new shareholder profile into account?  
At this very preliminary stage in my own thinking, I would suggest the 
following thought experiment: let us consider three separate, well-
understood fact paradigms that have arisen in Delaware corporate law.  I 
will briefly walk you through each of them, and then conclude. 
The first fact paradigm is classic Unocal19:  a board adopts defenses 
against a hostile takeover.  A shareholder class (and the hostile bidder) 
sues, claiming the board breached its fiduciary duty by interfering with 
the shareholders’ right to sell their shares at a premium above current 
market price.20  In this area, our case law is quite paternalistic, in the 
sense that it is highly shareholder protective.  Beginning with Unocal in 
1985, Delaware courts have consistently held that the target company 
board has not only the power but also the duty to protect the 
shareholders against hostile offers that the board reasonably believes 
                                                                                                  
 18. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the 
Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (2002). 
 19. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 20. See id. at 949–52. 
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pose a threat to corporate policy.  And, the board may do that by 
adopting proportionate defensive measures.21 
The Unitrin case exemplifies this paternalistic approach.22  There, 
the Delaware Supreme Court held that a target board has the prerogative 
to determine that the market undervalues the target company’s stock, 
and may protect its shareholders from offers that do not reflect the 
corporation’s long term value under management’s business plan.23  But, 
the Unitrin Court went even further.  It held that the target company 
board’s entitlement to defend, and thereby prevent the shareholders from 
deciding on their own whether or not to accept the hostile bid, could be 
justified on a theory of “substantive coercion.”24  I refer to the concept 
that the shareholders might accept the hostile bidder’s inadequate offer 
“because of ‘ignorance or mistaken belief’ regarding the Board’s 
assessment of the long term value of [the target company’s] stock.”25 
Clearly that paternalistic fiduciary duty approach rests on a model 
of target company shareholders as being diffuse, financially 
unsophisticated, and powerless to protect themselves—in the words of 
one Delaware judge, as having “rube-like qualities.”26  The question is 
whether, given the reality of today’s shareholder profile, the 
shareholder-protective premise that underlies the Unocal doctrine in 
paradigm takeover defense cases has continued vitality. 
At least one Chancery case has addressed that question, although 
not at the theoretical level.  In Chesapeake Corporation v. Shore,27 then 
Vice Chancellor (now Chancellor) Strine was confronted with a 
substantive coercion argument.  In Chesapeake, the target board 
adopted, as a takeover defense, a supermajority voting rule for 
shareholder-proposed amendments to the by-laws.  The board justified 
that defense on the basis that the bid was inadequate and posed the 
threat that the shareholders and the capital markets would not fully 
understand the superior dollar value of management’s business plan as 
compared to the hostile offer.  The Chancellor rejected that argument, 
not on theoretical grounds, but on the basis that the board had produced 
no evidence that there was any risk of shareholder confusion.  That is, 
                                                                                                  
 21. Id. at 957–58. 
 22. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. at 1383–85. 
 25. Id. at 1385. 
 26. Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 328 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 27. Id. 
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the court did not consider itself bound to accept without question a 
defense based on an abstract fiduciary theory that was untethered to 
empirical facts.  Chesapeake may be viewed as one example of a court 
rejecting, on empirical grounds, the traditional shareholder model that 
implicitly justified the exercise of fiduciary power to defend against a 
hostile bid.  Whether the Supreme Court would have validated that 
approach will never be known, because Chesapeake was never 
appealed. 
But suppose it had been?  In that event, my court might have been 
called upon to reexamine an underlying theoretical premise of Unocal—
that courts must give deference to a target board’s determination that a 
hostile bid poses a threat that justifies a defensive response.  Chesapeake 
rejected that deferential approach insofar as it refused to credit the 
claimed substantive coercion threat solely on the basis of the target 
board’s say-so.  Chesapeake, I would suggest, can be viewed as 
obliquely challenging the validity of the shareholder profile model on 
which the substantive coercion theory rests.  That case also illustrates 
one way a court might respond analytically to the disjunction between 
fact and theory.  Is such a response the best approach?  At this point my 
own thinking is too undeveloped to say.  But what I can say is that 
Chesapeake gives effect to the view that the new shareholder profile 
reality has overtaken the empirical model that implicitly undergirds an 
important theoretical premise of Unocal. 
I next turn to a second fact paradigm, which is rooted in Revlon.28  
A target board decides to sell the target company as a response to a 
hostile bid.  That provokes a bidding war, and the target board agrees to 
sell the company to the low bidder that (for whatever reason) the board 
prefers to deal with.  A shareholder class (and the disfavored high 
bidder) sue, claiming a breach of fiduciary duty under Revlon and its 
progeny.  Those cases hold that the courts must protect shareholders 
from fiduciary decisions to sell the company in a transaction that will 
not yield the highest available value.  Again, the question for us is 
whether, given the new shareholder profile reality, the degree of 
shareholder protection afforded in Revlon-type cases is still appropriate. 
In this setting, unlike Unocal, a good argument can be made that 
the new shareholder reality should not matter either to the analysis or the 
result.  Why?  Because in this scenario, the directors have contractually 
                                                                                                  
 28. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986). 
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committed the company to a sale transaction that involves deal 
protection measures.  Those measures would be triggered if an offeror 
with a superior bid prevails over the favored bidder that is offering less.  
As a result, the unsuccessful bidder, even if it loses the company, will 
reap the benefits of the deal protection measures. 
QVC29 is the quintessential example.  Under the merger agreement 
there, the favored bidder, Viacom, had contractual deal protections that 
would enable Viacom to walk away with over $1 billion of target 
company assets if the competing bidder, QVC, won the bidding war for 
the company.  In those circumstances, only the courts, and not the 
institutional shareholders—however empowered or sophisticated they 
might be—have the power to prevent that from happening.  So, the 
answer for the Revlon fact paradigm may differ from that in Unocal-
type cases. 
But, I do not mean to oversimplify.  There may be other forms of 
Revlon-type M&A transactions where the need for shareholder 
protection is less compelling.  Time does not permit me to explore or 
elaborate that thought here, except to say that the relevant inquiry would 
be whether, given the new shareholder profile reality, the shareholders 
as a group are able and motivated to protect themselves without court 
intervention.  In cases where the answer is yes, the courts will be 
challenged, doctrinally speaking, either to formulate an exception to 
Revlon in those cases or to articulate a new governing theoretical 
concept. 
The third, and final, paradigm situation I will address involves the 
“going private” transactional cases.  A controlling stockholder acquires 
the minority shares in a merger or an economically equivalent set of 
transactions.  For our purposes, these going private cases may be 
divided into two subcategories.  In the first—a long-form merger of the 
target company into an entity controlled by the controlling 
shareholder—the profile of the stockholder base is probably irrelevant.  
In the second—a two-step transaction consisting of a tender offer 
designed to elevate the controlling stockholder’s interest to 90%, 
followed by a short-form merger—the composition or profile of the 
shareholder base may be highly relevant to the fiduciary analysis. 
To better understand why, consider the classic “long-form” merger.  
Here the controlling shareholder, a fiduciary, has the raw power to force 
the minority shareholders to accept the merger on whatever financial 
terms, however unfair, the controller desires.  In these circumstances, 
                                                                                                  
 29. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
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the shareholders, whether they be institutions or individuals, are 
powerless to change the result by self-help, since the majority 
stockholder has the voting power to dictate the result.  In this setting, the 
nature of the shareholder profile would appear irrelevant.  The only 
protection available is through the courts, which would require the 
fiduciary to prove that the merger is objectively and entirely fair, both as 
to process and price.30 
But now consider a second transactional form through which a 
buyout of the minority interest may be accomplished.  Under that form 
the nature of the shareholder profile may matter greatly.  I refer to a 
two-step Siliconix-type transaction, where the controlling shareholder 
first makes a tender offer for enough minority shares to raise its 
ownership to the 90% level, and then follows up with a “short-form” 
merger.  Under Delaware law, neither step, if considered separately, is 
subject to entire fairness review.31  The question is: should the courts 
view these two steps separately, in which case there would be no 
fairness review, even though the economic result is precisely the same 
as a single step going private merger?  Or, should the courts disregard 
the separateness of the two transactions and treat them collectively as if 
they were a single acquisition requiring fairness review?  The Supreme 
Court has not yet addressed this question; the Court of Chancery has. 
This development began only recently, in 2001, with the Siliconix 
decision, which treated each transactional step separately, with each step 
governed by different review standards prescribed by Supreme Court 
precedent.32  Later Chancery cases embroidered and modified Siliconix.  
In all these cases the Court of Chancery was fully mindful of the risk 
that this novel two-step approach could deprive shareholders of the 
protections afforded by classic fairness review.  Therefore, in post-
Siliconix decisions, that court imposed, on a case-by-case basis, 
additional disclosure requirements and structural protections that 
                                                                                                  
 30. See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 31. Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001) (holding 
there is no fairness review required in a short-form merger); Solomon v. Pathe 
Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996) (holding there is no fiduciary duty to offer a 
fair price in a tender offer involving full disclosure and no coercion). 
 32. In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. CIV. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 
(Del. Ch. June 19, 2001). 
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incorporated de facto certain elements of fairness review.33  Since the 
Supreme Court has yet to address the merits of this alternative doctrinal 
pathway to achieving the identical economic result as the classic going 
private merger, I disclaim any comment on the merits.  I describe this 
transactional form merely to illustrate, on a hypothetical basis, how the 
new shareholder reality might factor into a fiduciary duty analysis in a 
concrete setting. 
This two-step acquisition format differs from the classic one-step 
long form merger in one important respect: it requires the minority 
shareholders to tender enough shares for the controller to reach the 90% 
level.  If, as the traditional model assumes, the shareholders are 
disaggregated, unsophisticated retail investors unable to protect 
themselves, then the types of shareholder procedural protections 
reflected in the Siliconix line of cases would be justified.  But, if the 
minority shares are held primarily by sophisticated institutions, then all 
those institutions need do to prevent the controller from reaching the 
90% level is refuse to tender their shares.  Under that hypothesis, 
perhaps the inquiry should be: (i) do the institutions have sufficient 
shares to prevent the offer from succeeding, and (ii) if so, are the 
institutions motivated to withhold their shares in order to force a better 
price, and are there any obstacles to their doing so?  One might advance 
a counterargument that this kind of analysis is too costly and imposes 
undue case management burdens on the courts.  But that would be a 
debate for another day.  My modest proposition is only that the new 
shareholder profile is an irrefutable reality that justifies inquiring into 
whether courts should take that into account in formulating and applying 
fiduciary duty principles. 
**** 
I will stop at this point and leave you with one final thought.  If 
there is merit to the notion that courts should take into account the new 
shareholder reality in formulating and applying fiduciary doctrine, it is 
also true that courts can accomplish that only on a case-by-case basis. A 
downside of the common law process is that it risks balkanizing into 
small pieces, a larger set of issues that are perhaps better viewed in more 
                                                                                                  
 33. In re Pure Resources, Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002); In 
re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re CNX Gas 
Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
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comprehensive theoretical terms.  That is why, in my opinion, the 
judiciary would profit by having the benefit of a systemic academic 
analysis of these conceptual questions, rather than addressing them on 
an ad hoc basis.  That important endeavor will require a degree of 
analytical firepower that the legal academy is uniquely situated to 
provide. 
 
 
 
 
 
